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Western scholars， with few exceptions， have usually regarded the 
Supreme Soviet as a ritualistic， mock-representative body， orat best，as 
a device for testing public opinion， a school for impressing relatively 
humble and provincial figures， or an agency for the transmission of 
central policies and decisions~ These views reflect the large gap bet-
ween the official idealised view of this institution and its suspected 
performance. Recent changes， however， and especially， the proliferation 
of the Standing Commissions of the federal Supreme Soviet and the 
increasing reports of their activities in the Soviet press have prompted 
a few Western scholars to look more c10sely at this particular in-
stitution.2 Along with this there has been some renewal of theoretical 
interest in the role and importance of the Supreme Soviet in the Soviet 
political system. ln an earlier study， 1 have attempted to chart the 
systemic relationship among the actual functions of the Supreme Soviet 
bodies and between these and their formal functions.3 These laUer 1 
have classified as organizational， pseudo-executive， legislative， and 
supervisory functions ( see Appendix， Chart 1 ).
Most contemporary Western scholars have focussed their aUention 
on the participatory and administrative roles of the Supreme Soviet and 
its auxiliary organs， the Standing Commissions.4 Although none of the 
( 1 ) 
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scholars concerned systematic analysis of the actual operation of the 
Supreme Soviet organs， their views nonetheless represent a con! 
siderable departure from conventional views on this particular in-
stitution. 
The Supreme Soviet organs' administrative role is derived from the 
nature of the Soviet system as one which seeks to link up organi-
zationally the various sectors of society through the duplication and 
overlapping of functions and the multiplication and interweaving of 
offices---particularly the Party， government and economic apparat-
uses. The Supreme Soviet organs appear to perform a mobilizational 
role at two levels. The first is related to‘public relations' in the broad 
sense in Soviet society. A communication system built into the Supreme 
Soviet organs and embracing both downward and upward commun司
ication could foster better public relations by making the government 
more responsive to the problems of citizens and sectional groups， whi1e 
at the same time promoting wider positive awareness of official poli町
cies. The second level is that of administrative mobilization. The 
Supreme Soviet organs appear to contribute to the mobilization of the 
administration mainly through the medium of its Standing Commis-
sions， and in two ways: first， by exercising kontrol' over the per-
formance of administrative bodies so as to help prevent them from 
straying from the approved channels: and secondly， by facilitating 
administrative co-ordination， co-operation and conciliation in pursuit of 
official objectives. In this connection， the regional Party first secre-
taries seem to play a crucial role in the processes of the Supreme Soviet 
organs. 
The participatory role of the Supreme Soviet organs relates to the 
much-discussed question of the devolution of policy-making in the 
Soviet Union since the death of Stalin.s One aspect of this devolution 
process is the increased power of local soviets. The regime has devoted 
considerable effort to strengthening the local soviet organizations， 
particularly since the Twentieth Party Congress.6 It has been a constant 
theme of successive Soviet leaders -though it is worth noting that 
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Brezhnev speaks in relatively more concrete terms than Khrushchev.7 A 
number of steps have been taken by the Party in furtherance of the 
leadership's policy of enlivening the soviets.8 Of particular importance 
here were the laws relating to the rights and obligations of village and 
settlement soviets， and the rights and obligations of district and city 
soviets， enacted on 19 November 1969 and 19 March 1971 respectively.9 
These laws were chiefly aimed at enhancing the status of the local 
soviets.10 It should be noted that the activities of the local soviets are 
closely supervised by the republican Supreme Soviet Presidia， whose 
major supervisory work is centred precisely on these activities. The 
transfer of power from higher local soviets (krai and oblast ) tolower 
local soviets has not， however， proceeded without resistance.11 The 
acceleration in the activities of the lower local soviets in accordance 
with the above-mentioned two laws， moreover， has called for supe-
rvision and co-ordination by not only the republican Supreme Soviet 
Presidia， but also by the regional Party committees. The latter also 
found themselves under pressure from the lower local soviets who 
required additional funds to meet increased executive responsibilities 
and it was incumbent on them to find ways of responding to these 
demands. 
The enactment of laws and regulations， their implementation， 
amendment and eventual replacement by new legislation forms a 
continuous cyclical process in the Soviet Union as elsewhere. This is 
one context in which the informal participation of the regional first 
secretaries may be helping to shape the situation in which the ‘col-
lective leadership' acts. Undoubtedly， the Soviet policy process con-
tinues to be a closely controlled and highly organized one， and the 
Supreme Soviet organs remain one of the less important arenas for 
policy-related activities. Moreover， their involvement in the policy--
making process (and this applies also to the local soviet organs ) is
virtually confined to such areas of state activity such as everyday 
services， public eating facilities， housing and school construction， public 
health， education， etc. 
( 3 ) 
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The opportunities for public political participation in influencing 
decisions within the framework of official policies are of course greater 
at locallevels than at the republican and federallevels， and presumably 
affect the role of the regional first secretaries more directly. Despite 
these qualifications， itis the author's belief that the Supreme Soviet 
organs constitute a significimt context within which the regional first 
secretaries now operate at the federal level. 
While our attention in this paper wiJl be centred on the role played 
by the regional first secretaries in the Federal Supreme Soviet Standing 
Commissions， itwill necessarily involve some consideration of the 
operations of other Supreme Soviet organs， particularly the Presidium. 
Another aspect we should bear in mind is that the Standing Com-
missions of the federal Supreme Soviet came into operation in 1938， but 
existed for a long time in a virtually moribund state. As 1 will note 
later， itis only over the last ten years that new life has clearly been 
breathed into this apparently moribund structure (see Table 1 and I ).12 
The Standing Commissions appear to have now reconstituted their 
structure and processes， permitting new functions， values and tech-
niques to be introduced， diffused and assimilated. If‘institutionaliza -
tion' is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire 
value and stability，13 then we can say that the Standing Commissions 
have been undergoing such a process of institutionalization. It would 
thus be appropriate， within the context of this process of institutional 
development to analyse the importance of the regional first secretaries' 
position in the ‘organization' and of the scale， scope and nature of their 
activities in these ‘processes'. First， however， we must briefly describe 
the recent development of the federal Standing Commissions. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS 
Over the last ten years， large changes have occurred in the number， 
range， membership and rules of procedure of the Standing Commissions. 
Table 1 shows that there was no increase in the number of Standing 
Commissions until the seventh convocation (1966)， although in the same 
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period there were some increases in their average membership. From 
the sixth to the seventh convocations， however， the number of Com-
missions was sharply increased followed by a further substantial in-
crease during the eighth convocation. As a result， 66 per cent of the 
deputies (1，000 ) are now members of Standing Commissions. The 
Credentials， Foreign Affairs， Budget and Legislative Proposals Com-
missions have existed since the first convocation， while the Economic 
Commission14 of the Soviet of Nationalities was formed in 1957 in the 
wake of the 1957 reorganization of the economic administration， which 
involved substantial decentralization to the republic. In addition to the 
already existing Commissions， the following Commissions (generally 
called ‘branch Commissions' )15 were set up in 1966: Agriculture; Educa-
tion， Science and Culture; Public Health and Social Security; Construc-
tion and Industrial Building Materials; Transport， Communications and 
Industry; and Trade， Communal Economy and Everyday Services (By-
tovoe obsluzhivanie ). In 1971， two further Commissions were added， 
namely Y outh Affairs and Conservation. The Commission of Trans-
port， Communications and Industry is now divided into two Com-
missions， for Industry and for Transport and Communications. In 1974， 
a Consumers Commission was added in both Houses of the Supreme 
TABLE I 
STANDING COMMISSIONS OF FEDERAL SUPREME SOVIET 
4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 
Convocation years (54-58) (58-62) (62-6) (6-70) (70-74)‘(74ー78)
U' N" U N U N U N U N U N 
1. Number 4 5 4 5 4 5 10 10 13 13 14 14 
2. Average member. 
ship in each 
Sc. Com. 18 20 28 29 28 29 35 35 35 35 36 36 
3 . Percentage of 
deputies e!ected 
to the St. Com. 13.1% 18.8% 17.9% 46.1% 60.1% 65.9% 
(N umber of deputies 
e!ected to the 
Supreme Soviet) 1347 1378 1443 1517 1517 1517 
* Soviet of the Union * * Soviet of Nationa!ities 
( 5 ) 
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Soviet. In 1976， a Women's Labour and Conditions Commission and a 
Protection of Motherhood and Children Commission were added in both 
Houses of the Supreme Soviet.16 
THE REGIONAL FIRST SECRETARIES IN THE‘ORGANIZA-
TION'.17 
Organization is a means to attain perceived goals. The shape of the 
organizational structure will thus affect the execution of prescribed 
tasks. 
1. Membership 
The chairman of the Armenian Presidium， N. Kh. Arutunian stated 
that the effectiveness of a deputy's activity is largely dependent on his 
life experience， work previously engaged in， organizational skills， level 
of education， breadth of view， or simply the inclination to engage in 
civic activity.18 
Indeed， a careful study of the membership of the Standing Com-
missions for each convocation reveals certain trends in their composi-
tion suggestive of changes in the conception held by the Soviet leaders 
of the kind of personnel required by these bodies. Here， however， 1 shall 
TABLE I 
ORGANIZA TIONS IN WHICH CURRENT 
POSITIONS OF THE MEMBER ARE LOCA TED 
(Federal Standing Commゐsions)
5th convoc 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc. 
(N = 259) (N = 259) (N = 700) (N = 912) 
Party 37.5% 40.5% 30.4% 24.0% 
apparatus (N = 97) (N 二 105) (N = 213) (N = 219) 
Government 
29.3% 25.9% 15.0% 10.5% apparatus 
(N = 76) (N = 67) (N = 105) (N = 96) 
Agricultural 8.9% 6.6% 15.6% 20.4% 
enterprise (N = 23) (N = 17) (N = 17) (N = 186) 
lndustrial 8.9% 10.4% 18.4% 25.3% 
enterprise (N = 23) (N = 27) (N = 129) (N = 231) 
Others 15.4% 16.6% 20.6% 19.7% (N = 40) (N = 43) (N = 144) (N = 180) 
(6 ) 
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describe only a few of the major changes which occurred in the 
membership of the federal Standing Commissions. 
First， we can observe from Table I that there was a drastic 
reduction in the overall proportional participation of Party and govern-
ment officials， especially in latter， even though in absolute numbers of 
officials of the Party apparatus had more than doubled their earlier 
participation. On the whole， government participation has therefore 
declined vis-a-vis Party participation. The proportional and absolute 
increases in agricultural and industrial participation were much greater 
than either those of government or Party， and the participation of other 
organizations also increased although not to the same extent. At the 
same time， one should also note that in the eighth convocation (1970) of 
the federal Supreme Soviet， for instance， 219 out of 243 Party officials 
and 96 out of 171 government officials who were elected as deputies to 
the Supreme Soviet served as members of the Standing Commissions， 
as compared to 231 out of 395 industrial members and only 186 out of 
409 agricultural members. But it should also be noted that there have 
been considerable changes in the level and type of the Party and 
TABLE II 
NUMBl!.，1( OF LOCAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
IN FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS 
A. Regional lev巴1(krai， oblast， aut. repub.， okrug， etc.) 
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc. 9th convoc. 
Party 
First sec. 46 
others 2 
Go百ernment
Chairman 18 
others 2 
B. City， raion and settlement level 
Pa;γtヲ
First sec. 9 
others 
Government 
Chairman 5 
others 5 
64 
つ“ 
19 
2 
8 
6 
131 
4 
42 
30 
9 
3 
139 
3 
41 
35 
7 
3 
149 
n. a 
n. a. 
n. a. 
n. a. 
n目 a，
n. a 
n. a. 
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government officials represented. One of the most significant changes is 
the consistent increase of Party (and to a lesser extent government ) 
officials drawn from regional and lower levels. Most of the officials of 
these levels are top-line exe氾utive( see Table II ). First secretaries of 
regional ( krai and oblasl )* Party committees were the largest single 
occupational group in the membership up to the seventh convocation 
(1966) and at thβeighth convocation (1970) were exceeded only by the 
industrial workers. Furthermore， inthe eighth convocation， every re-
gional first secretary elected to the Supreme Soviet became a member 
either of the Presidium or of a Standing Commission，19 whereas only 158 
out of 347 industrial worker deputies were chosen as members of the 
Standing Commissions. 
In the eighth convocation， regional first secretaries occupied the 
chairmanship in only eight of the twenty-six Standing Commissions a 
majority of them (6) in the Commissions of the Soviet of the Union. 
However， ifone examines the chairmen of the ‘preparatory groups of 
deputies' (formed for preliminary examination of particular supervisory 
tasks) by their occupational positions， of the 43 preparatory groups 
examined， about half were chaired by the regional first secretaries. 
One might equally ask what categories of members of the Com-
missions have tended to retain their membership. Some interesting 
facts emerge from consideration of the federal Standing Commission at 
the eighth convocation (1970). (A comparable study cannot be done for 
membership of the seventh convocation be四 useof the vast expansion 
in total Standing Commission membership due to the creation of new 
Commissions.) There are 234 members who were members of the same 
Standing Commissions at the seventh (1966) and eighth (1970) convoca-
tions. Of these 234‘holdovers'， 61are first secretaries of regional Party 
committees， which means that 44% of the first secretaries of regional 
* Although the use of term電regional'is often limited to translation of 
( 8 ) 
word oblasl， we use it to so translate both oblasl and krai. There are 
only 6 krais against 143 oblasls at the time of the 9th convocation. 
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Party committees who are members of federal Standing Commissions 
at the eighth convocation (1970) were members of the same Standing 
Commissions at the seventh convocation (1966). The remaining 173 
‘holdovers' fal into 54 occupational groups. However， the ‘holdover' 
rate is far from being proportional to the number of seats which each 
of these positions represents in the Standing Commissions. Indeed， only 
7% of 158 industrial operatives， who are by far the biggest group in the 
Standing Commissions were members of the same Standing Com-
missions at the previous (seventh) convocation. The first secretaries of 
regional Party Committees will obviously remain the largest holdover 
group so long as the over-whelming majority of them continue to be 
selected as members of federal Standing Commissions. In other words， 
their holdover ratio in the Commissions is directly related to their 
occupational turnover ratio， although it could be reduced by transfers 
from one Commission to another. First secretaries of regional Party 
committees held over from previous convocations are to be found in al 
of the Standing Commissions. They constitute the largest group of 
holdovers in al Standing Commissions except those for Foreign Affairs 
and for Transport and Communications. To put it in other words， the 
greater continuity of first secretaries in the Standing Commissions only 
reflects their overall increased tenure in offices at regional level since 
1965.20 Nevertheless， a certain degree of stability in membership and in 
the kind of people re-elected ought not only ensure the continuity of the 
particular work in each Commission beyond their tenure of office but 
also facilitate the accumulation of experience gained during successive 
convocations. 
Having examined the actual representation of the regional first 
secretaries in the federal Standing Commissions， one might well doubt 
the claim that the Soviet concept of representation， Le. that the repre-
sentatives of the soviets are drawn from al sections of society， has 
much influence on the composition of the Supreme Soviet Standing 
Commissions.21 True， this claim has been particularly noticeable only 
since the seventh convocation (1966) (see TableI). However， as we 
( 9 ) 
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have seen certain categories of officials， and in particular the regional 
first secretaries continued to enjoy far better proportional repre-
sentation than people drawn from other occupations. We may aIso note 
here in parentheses that the cIaim of equal representation of the sexes 
is hardly borne out by the female representation rate of one in four in 
the federal Standing Commissions. Moreover， not a single woman 
currently enjoys the rank of obkom first secretary， and it is precisely 
this group that has been playing， inrecent convocations， the leading 
role in the federal Standing Commissions. 
2. Geographical linkages 
The Supreme Soviet organs have established relations with outside 
bodies through their operations and through their ordinary members. 
The laUer 1 call here ‘linkage'. It is my opinion that linkages established 
through the membership are of considerable relevance to the in-
stitutional development. One of the important geographical linkages 
established in the federal Standing Commissions is the links al of the 
regions existing in the USSR by way of the membership of almost al 
regional first secretaries in the Commissions. 1 have listed in Table IV 
the regions whose Party first secretaries are members of the various 
Commissions at the eighth and ninth convocations. One observation 
that can be made here is that some of these regions are notably 
concerned with the corresponding activities of the Commissions. For 
instance， atthe eighth convocation， complex industrial regions such as 
Bryansk， Tambov， Tula， East-Kazakhstan and Zaporozh'e are al in the 
Budget and Planning Commissions. Comparatively rural regions such 
as Bukhara， Karakalpak， Khakass， Krasnodar， Kustanai， Orenburg， 
Poltava， and North-Kazakhstan are represented in the Commissions for 
Agriculture. Donets， Khar'kov， Kemerovo， Sverdlovsk and V olgograd， 
which are known as heavy industrial and mining regions， are al 
represented in the Commissions for Industry. Light or mixed industrial 
regions such as 1 vanovo， Kashkadar'ya and Krasnoyarsk are also in 
these Commissions. Irkutsk， Karaganda， Lipetsk and Leningrad where 
(10) 
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TABLE IV-A 
REGIONAL， REPRESENTATION 
IN THE FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS+ (8th convocation only) 
Credentials (12 obkoms) (2) Legislative Proρosals (14 obkoms) 
Alma.Ata 
Amur 
Gorno. Badakhshan 
Grodno 
Kalinin 
Kalmyk 
Kaluga 
Kokchetav 
N agorno. Karabakh 
Sakhalin 
Ul'yanovsk 
V oroshilovgrad 
M 
C 
Adygei 
Cherkassy 
Chernovitsy 
Chita 
Chuvash 
Kabardino. Balkar 
Minsk 
Mordva 
Odessa 
Saratov 
Ryazan' 
South Ossetia 
Ural' 
Yakutsk 
?????
?
?
??
??
Fore伊ベ助irs(3 obkoms) 
Arkhangel 
Brest 
Khmel'nitsky 
(4) 
C 
(18 obkoms) 
Tuva 
Udmurt 
(3) Budget and Planning 
c 
c 
C 
Vladimir 
East.Kazakhstan 
Zaporozh'e 
C 
C 
Adzhar 
Bryansk 
Checheno 
Ingush 
Chernigov 
Karelia 
Kirov 
Crimea 
Kurgan 
N akhichevan' 
Novgorod 
Surkhandaria 
Tambov 
Tula 
M 
c 
c 
C 
C 
???
The regional names listed in this Table are the names of the obkom. 
Exceptions to this are marked with本 indicatingkraikom. The mark M 
inclicates these regions whose first secretaries are ful members of the 
CC， CPSU and those marked with C indicate candidate members of the 
CC， CPSU. 
M 
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(11 obkoms & 
1 kraikom) 
Khar'kov 
Kashkadar'ya 
Kemerovo 
Krasnoyarsk* 
Magadan 
Perm' 
Sverdlovsk 
Volgograd 
Volynia 
Yaroslavl' 
lndustη 
Donets 
Ivanovo 
(6) 
M 
M 
????
C 
(12 obkoms & 
1 kraikom) 
Bukhara 
Karakalpak 
Khakass 
Kirovograd 
Krasnodar* 
Kustanai 
Mari 
Omsk 
Orenburg 
Poltava 
Rostov 
N orth. Kazakhstan 
Voronezh 
(5) Agriculture 
????
Transtortation and 
Communications (11 obkoms) 
Aktyubinsk 
Gor'ky 
Gur'ev 
Karachaevo.Cherkess 
N ovosibirsk 
Osh 
Smolensk 
Sumy 
Syrdaria 
Temopol' 
Tyumen' 
C 
(8) 
M 
M 
M 
Construction and lndustrial 
Building Materials (9 obkoms & 
1 kraikom) 
Dzhambul 
Gomel' 
Fergana 
Irkutsk 
Karaganda 
Lipetsk 
Leningrad 
Pavlodar 
Primor'e* 
M 
(7) 
M 
C 
M 
M 
Public Health and Social 
Secutぜか (9 obkoms) 
Ashkhabad 
Buryat 
Chimkent 
Komi 
Kursk 
Kzyl.Orda 
L'vov 
Nikolaev 
Rovno 
C 
(10) 
C 
M 
C 
Education， Science and 
Culture (6 obkoms) 
Dnepropetrovsk 
Kherson 
N orth Ossetia 
Penza 
Samarkand 
Vologda 
(9) 
(12) 
M 
c 
c 
C 
(1) Trade， Eveηday Services 
and Communal Economy 
(10 obkoms & 1 kraikom) 
M Belgorod 
M Khabarovsk* 
C Kostroma 
M Kuibyshev 
C Mogilev 
C Murmansk 
C Pskov 
Semipalatinsk 
Tashkent 
Transkarpa thia 
Vinnitsa 
(13) Conservation (9 obkoms & 
2 kraikoms) 
Abkhaz M Orel 
M Altaiホ M Stavropol'* 
Andizhan' Taldy-Kurgan 
Astrakhan' Zhitomir 
M Dagestan 
C Ivano-Franko 
Khorezm 
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(12) Youth A刀airs (7 obkoms & 
1 kraikom) 
Gorno-Altai 
Kamchatka 
M Krasnodar* 
Kiev 
Namangan 
C Tomsk 
Tselinograd 
Vitebsk 
TABLE IV-B 
REGIONAL REPRESENTA TION 
IN THE FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSONS (9th convocation only). 
(1) Credentials (9 obkom) 
C Checheno-Ingush 
Dzhizaksk 
Gorno-Badakhshan 
M Kalinin 
C Kalmyk 
C Kaluga 
M N ovosibirsk 
M Sakhalin 
Syrdaria 
(2) Legislative Pro戸osals (13 obkom & 
1 kraikom 
?? ?? ?????? ???
?
? ?
??
?
?
?
?
??? ??
? ?
C Karakalpak M Ryazan 
M Khar'kov M Saratov 
M Krasnodarホ C Tashkent 
M Minsk M Tula 
N a gboa r n o-v v TEar kh M ororlezh 
M Yakutsk 
(13) 
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(3) Budget and Planning (17obkom) 
Adzhar M Rostov 
Chernigov 
M Gor'ki 
M Karelia 
C Tambov 
C Tomsk 
C Tyumen' 
(4) Foreign A.βairs 
C Arkhangel 
Brest 
M Kaliningrad 
C Vladimir 
(6 obkom) 
Khorezm Surkhandaria M V oroshilovgrad 
C Crimea M Udmurt Jewish， A.O 
C Kurgan Vostochno-Kazakhstan 
N akhichevan' C 
M Omsk 
Zaporozh'e 
(5) Agriculture (12obkom) 
Bukhara C Mordva 
lssyk-kul' M Orenburg 
Kirovograd C Orel 
C Kokchetav C Poltava 
M Kustanai M Ural 
C Mari M Vologda 
(7) Construction and !ndustrial 
Building Materials (9 obkom 
and 2 kraikom) 
Chardzhou 
Fergana 
Gomel' 
M Irkutsk 
M Karaganda 
M Krasnoyarskホ
Kulyab 
Leninabad 
C Lipetsk 
Pavlodar 
M Primorieホ
(9) Education， Scie担ceand 
Culture (8 obkom) 
Khmel' nitskii 
Mangyshlak 
Mary 
C N orth Ossetia 
C Novgorod 
Taldy-Kurgan 
M Penza 
Volynia 
(14) 
(6) lndustηy 
M Donetsk 
(9obkom) 
C Magadan 
M Dnepropetrovsk Naryn 
Kashkadarya M Sverdlovsk 
M Kemerovo M V olgograd 
Krasnovodsk 
(8) Trans戸orfationand 
Communications (12 obkom) 
M Amur 
C Chuvash 
Dzhezkazgan 
Gur'ev 
M Ivano-Franko 
Karachaevo-
Cherkess 
C Kzyl-Orda 
C Pskov 
Rovno 
C Smolensk 
Sumy 
Ternopol' 
(10) Public Health and 
Social Secu1ぜか (12obkom) 
C Aktyubinsk Nikolaev 
Ashkhabad C Kirov 
M Buryat C Komi 
C Chita C Kursk 
DzhambLjl Turgai 
Kherson M Tuva 
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(1) Trade， Eveηday Services (12) Youth A.刀μ符 (8obkom and 
and Communal Economy (7 obkom 1 kraikom 
1 kraikom 
Cherkassy C Samarkand M Alma-Ata M Stavropol' 
Grodno Transcarpathia C Belgorod C Tselinograd 
M Khabarovskホ C Vinnitsa Gorno・Altai M Ul'yanovsk 
M Perm' Semipalatinsk M Kiev Vitebsk 
South Ossetia 
(13) Co抑servation (11 obkom and (14) Co刀sumerGoods (10 obkom) 
1 kγ且i初明
Abkhaz M Dagestan Chernovstsy C Kostroma 
M Altaiホ M L'vov M Chelyabinsk M Kuibyshev 
Andizhan Osh C Ivanovo Namangan 
C Astrakhan' Murmansk Kamchatka C North Kazakh-stan 
M Bryansk Tashauz Khakass 
Chimkent Zhitomir 
a variety of industrial building materials are produced， are al in the 
Commissions for Construction and Industrial Building Materials. An 
important industrial region， Gor'ky， a complex gas pipe line region， 
Gur'ev and an oil-producing region， Tyumen' are in the Transportation 
and Communications Commissions. Altai and Astrakhan， which are 
both faced with the problems of industrial pollution， and Stavropol'， 
which is concerned with the problems of land development and irriga-
tion are in the Conservation Commissions. The pattern of regional 
representation noted above is somewhat similar to those in the ninth 
convocation (see the same Table-B)， although there are some variations 
between the two convocations (compare A and B of Table IV). At al 
events， the Commissions for Credentials， for Education， Science and 
Culture， for Public Health and Social Security， for Trade， Everyday 
Services and Communal Economy， for Youth Affairs and for Consumer 
Goods can be represented by any regional first secretaries since al 
regions are concerned with these problems. And， ifone looks at the 
actual number of regions whose first secretaries are at the same time 
(15) 
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TABLE V. HOLDOVER RATE (regional first secretaries at the 9th convoca. 
tion who were also members of the same Standing Commissions at 
the 8th convocation) AND THEIR PERIOD OF SER VICE AS 
REGIONAL FIRST SECRETARY AT THE TIME OF ELEC. 
TION 
More than 60% 01 Holdover 
Averageρeriod 
01 se仰 zce
% (no.) 8th 9th 
Industry 67 ( 6) 5 years 7 years 
Budget and Planning 65 (11) 7 8 
Construction and Industrial 
Building Materials 64 ( 7) 4 7 
Between 50 and 60% 
Conservation 58 ( 7) 3 7 
Credentials 56 ( 5) 7 9 
Legislative Proposals 50 ( 7) 6 8 
Public Health and 
Social Security 50 ( 6) 5 4 
Trade，Everyday E Services 
and Communal Economy 50 ( 4) 4 5 
Between 30 and 50% 
Agriculture 42 ( 5) 7 8 
Transportation and 
Communications 3 ( 4) 4 5 
Y outh Affairs 3 ( 3) 6 7 
Under 30% 
Education， Science 
and Culture 25 ( 2) 8 5 
Foreign Affairs 17 ( 1) 6 9 
Total average 46.9% (68) 5.5 6.7 
full or candidate members of the Central Committee， the above men-
tioned six Commissions seem to enjoy a relatively lower status in the 
hierarchy of Commissions than say， the Legislative Proposals， Budget 
and Planning， and Industry Commissions. Conversely， the hierarchy of 
regions in the Soviet Union is reflected over time in the kinds of 
Standing Commissions to which regions have been assigned representa-
tion through their first secretaries. 
Speaking of the geographicallinkages， itis worthnoting that under 
Brezhnev there has been a policy of recruiting most regional first 
secretaries locally.22 Under Khrushchev many first secretaries were 
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appointed from outside the region， whereas under Brezhnev， two.thirds 
of the first secretaries appointed between October 1965 and March 1971 
were selected from the region， and five.sixths of those appointed 
between April 1971 and April 1976.23 On an average， a litle less than 
half of the regional first secretaries have been selected as members of 
the same Standing Commissions for two convocations consecutively 
(see Table V). Accordingly， the average period of service as regional 
first secretary at the time of election has lengthened from 5.5 years at 
the 8th convocation to 6.7 years at the 9th convocation (see Table V). 
This means an increased familiarity with the activities and operations 
of both their own regions and their respective Commissions. Finally， if
one investigates the national origins of the regional first secretaries in 
the Commissions at the 8th and 9th convocations， relatively high non. 
Russian representation will be observed in the Commissions for Legisla. 
tive Proposals， for Agriculture， for Transportation and Communi. 
cations， for Education， Science and Culture， for Public Health and 
Social Security， and for Conservation， whereas a strong Russian 
representation is seen in the Commissions for Industry， Construction 
and Industrial Building Materials， and for Consumer Goods， and 
a balanced representation is seen in the Commissions for Credentials， 
for Budget and Planning， for Trade， Everyday Services and Communal 
Economy， and for Y outh Affairs. Thus， the pattern of nationality 
representation may have some relevance to the particular activities 
of individual Commissions. 
3. Expertise 
The regional first secretaries share certain characteristics. First， 
they have usually obtained experience as managers and/or specialists 
in one or more field at some stage of their career. Secondly， the 
regional first secretaries are well established mid.career politicians 
who have acquired the capacity for balancing different and numerous 
pressures one against another， while maintaining a certain degree of 
confidence between the centre and themselves and their respective 
(22) 
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regions. These common features should facilitate smooth communi-
cation between them in the Standing Commissions. Above al， their 
presence might also serve to offset any excessive tendency toward a 
purely technical attitude， Our interest here will be whether these well 
qualified and technically proficient representatives of the Soviet politi-
cal elite have relevant experience in the respective Commissions to 
which they have been assigned. 
Tables VI and VI show that a certain degree of relevant expertise 
is regarded as one of the major prerequisites for regional first secre-
taries to be members of certain Standing Commissions. This is parti-
cularly pronounced in the Commissions for Agriculture， for Industry， 
for Construction and Industrial Building Materials and for Transporta-
tion and Communications， whose regional first secretaries are over-
whelmingly persons who have completed higher education in agricu-
lture or industry， or previously engaged in agriculture or industry. In 
the remaining Commissions， regional first secretaries' educational 
background and career experience were far less frequently directly 
relevant. Here， one might surmise that so long as a substantial nucleus 
of directly relevant specialities is present (not only regional first secre-
taries but also other Commission members)， the other specialities 
represented by their regional first secretary members may be ‘func-
tional'， in helping to secure a flow of information relating to their 
various fields， and to supply checks from the standpoint of various 
kinds of technical and professional qualifications. A few further di-
fferences may be observed. First， a higher proportion of secretaries in 
the Commissions for Legislative Proposals， for Budget and Planning， 
for Transportation and Communications， for Public Health and Social 
Security， for Trade， Everyday Services and Communal Economy， and 
for Youth Affairs have completed the Higher Party School. Secondly， 
those with a:dministrative careers in the Soviet apparatus are more in 
evidence in the Commissions for Budget and Planning， for Public 
Health and Social Security， and for Trade， Everyday Services and 
Communal Economy than in other Commissions. Finally， the relatively 
(23) 
193 
new Commissions for Y outh Affairs and for Conservation (the former 
is believed to have been created as a result of Czechoslovak Crisis of 
1968) both have a strong representation of regional first secretaries who 
have had career exp'erience in Komsomol apparatus. 
The data on non-Party organizational experience of the regional 
first secretaries do not suggest a single definitive explanation of the 
role of the regional first secretaries in the Commissions. Nevertheless， 
one may observe that there is a logical relationship， atleast in some 
Commissions， between the background characteristics of regional first 
secretaries and particular Commissions to which they have been assig. 
ned. One may also observe a relationship between the regions repre-
sented by their first secretaries and the responsibilities of the Com. 
missions. This data strongly suggest that the Soviet leadership expects 
the secretaries to contribute their technical and administrative ex-
pertise to the Commissions' work， while at the same time allowing them 
a certain scope to pursue regional concerns in the activities of the 
Supreme Soviet organs. 
While there is at least prima facie evidence that the regional first 
secretaries are expected to perform both a technical and an admi. 
nistrative role through their activity in the Standing Commissions， 
more specific information on this is extremely difficult to come by， and 
there is litle profit in attempting to examine this in greater detail. 
Instead we will turn to another aspect that is implicit in much of the 
foregoing， namely the political role played by the regional first secre. 
taries in these Supreme Soviet bodies. Our discussion will necessarily be 
somewhat speculative， but the topic is an important one that should be 
tackled in this context. 
POLITICAL ROLE OF THE REGIONAL FIRST SECRETARIES IN 
STANDING COMMISSIONS 
Among organizational theorists， itwas long taken for granted that 
politics is dysfunctional. However， some theorists such as Michel 
Crozier and Charles E. Lindblom have seriously studied the political 
(24) 
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system in organizations.24 More recently， some have argued that poli-
tics can serve in two ways: it can facilitate or inhibit the organization's 
productivity， stability or adaptability depending on the nature of the 
politics concerned.25 An organization in the process of institutionaliza-
tion may be termed ‘organic'， following Burns and Stalker who describe 
as‘organic' organizations of a fluid type with blurred lines of authority 
and free flows of information. In their study of the management of 
technical innovation， Burns and Stalker categorized organizations into 
two basic models，‘mechanistic' and ‘organic' and their research showed 
that the ‘organic' type of organization accommodates more political 
activities than the ‘mechanistic' type.26 Our supposition is， therefore， 
that politics is an inherent part of the process of institutionalization.27 
While new functions， values and techniques are to be introduced to the 
Standing Commissions， and while divergent values as to the operations 
of the Standing Commissions are held by individuals or groups of 
participants (participants do not mean only the members of the Stand-
ing Commissions but also the outsiders who participate in the politics 
of the Standing Commissions2B)， politics such as when a group or an 
individual tries to gain an advantage over another in order to pursue its 
concerns is thus inevitable. The likely sources of politics may be listed 
as follows. Through the processes of the Supreme Soviet organs， groups 
or individuals a) compete over available resources such as status， 
power to influence the behaviour and position of others， planning 
decisions and financial sources; b) establish authority relations29 among 
themselves or define their role in the operations of the Supreme Soviet 
organs; c) compete to formalize functional values of the operations of 
the Standing Commissions; and d) strengthen their own identity by way 
of establishing functional power relations with other organizations. 
Because the common denominator of formal interest among partici-
pants， i.e. building communist society， isso great， and because politics 
such as described above is doctrinally unacceptable， these political 
activities are likely to be conducted esoterically. 
Aspect A: Politics over available resources such as status， power to 
(25) 
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influence the behaviour and position of others， planning decisions and 
financial resources. 
lt now appears to have become a status symbol for Party officials 
to be in the Supreme Soviet organs. The Secretary-General of the 
CPSU is in the federal Presidium and first secretaries of the republican 
Parties are in the republican Presidia. The regional first secretaries 
have also found an ideal part-symbolic institution， namely the federal 
Standing Commissions， to maintain political status. Some of the other 
secretaries of local Party committees are either in the federal or 
republican Standing Commissions. The meetings of the Supreme Soviet 
organs indeed give an appearance of becoming a disguised convocation 
(in addition to the plenary meetings of the Central Committee) for 
Party officials. 
The participants in such politics mayenvisage the Supreme Soviet 
organs as a base for not only building up status but also extending or 
limiting the pursuit of political power. For instance， the Secretary-
General may like to use the Supreme Soviet organs as a device to help 
curb the local power of regional machines. One effect of the criticism 
directed by republican Presidia at particular localities must be to 
disturb local patterns of informal relationships and thereby make it 
more difficult for local leaders such as the first secretary of the 
regional Party committee to build up a strong clientele.30 It seems， on 
the surface at least， that this type of action by the republican Presidia 
is meant to deter any informal groups， particularly regional1y-based 
groups， from indulging in nepotism， and pursuing their own interests as 
against national interests. And regular visits to Moscow by the regional 
first secretaries through the meetings of the Standing Commissions 
may also help foster their subservience to the central authority. The 
problems of the loyalty between the central and regional authorities is 
not the monopoly of the Soviet political system. In order to maintain 
the obedience of the feudal lords， the Tokugawa bα向ル ofJapan (1603--
1865) both regularized and bureaucratized the old custom of homage (by 
which a vassal had been expected to go every so often in person to pay 
(26) 
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his respects to his overlord) by imposing the alternate residence system 
(commonly known as S仰 kinkofai). 
The regional first secretaries， whose holdover rate is the highest of 
al categories of Commission members， who often chair the sub-
commissions and who contribute information about their own regions 
on particular problems to the Commission concerned， may perceive the 
Supreme Soviet Standing Commissions as a potential arena of contend-
ing ceptre-region pressures. For instance， V.P. Borodin， chairman of the 
executive committee of V olgograd region， suggested in the sub-
commission studying the agricultural sections of the economic plan and 
the budget，“nothing， essentially， isbeing done to train specialists for 
the work in the livestock-raising complexes. The complexes employ 
considerable electric power and intricate equipment， which will be even 
more complicated tomorrow. It seems to me that the federal Ministry 
of Agriculture and Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary 
Education should think seriously of training personnel for work on 
automated livestock farms"31. On an earlier occasion， a similar opinion 
had been expressed by A.S. Drygin， 1 stsecretary of V ologda obkom (a 
rural area ) at one of the plenary meetings of the Commission of the 
Soviet of the Union. Pointing out the urgent need for specialists in rural 
areas， he quoted some relevant figures for his own region:“there are 
only 40 economists working in V ologda region which contains 441 rural 
production enterprises."“It is alarming"， he added，“that many of the 
higher education graduates have not received specialised education.吋 2
Unfortunately， we know nothing of the results of their suggestions. 
Another instance of this kind is that October 1969， the Commission for 
Construction and Industrial Building Materials of the Soviet of the 
Union adopted a resolution relating to the problems of mechanization 
and automation of construction works， and efficient utilization of 
construction machinery. This was based on a study by a preparatory 
group headed by N.V. Bannikov (first secretary， Karaganda obkom). 
The plenary meetings of the Commission were chaired by CPSU 
Central Committee secretary K.F. Katushev. The report on the plenary 
(27) 
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meetings of the Commission stated that certaiI). members， including S.R. 
Rasulov (first secretary， Tashkent gorkom )， V.K. Klimenko (chairman， 
Ukrainian TUC)， and I.M. Burov (first secretary， Pavlodar obkom) 
expressed particular concern on these problems.33 The chairman of the 
preparatory group and also the members reported as expressing views 
were the representatives of urban and industrial areas which would 
have been affected directly by these decisions. Finally， the Com-
mission's resolution was endorsed by the Presidium of the federal 
Council of Ministers within a week， a fact which was reported in the 
press34 -a most unusual occurence. Most of the Commission's proposals 
were related to better co-ordination of the activities concerned by 
government organs and other executive agencies. It may also have 
some relevance that this case occured in a period of intense lobbying 
operations in relation to the next five-year national economic plan.35 
As the latter case shows， the regional first secretaries may con-
ceive the Standing Commissions as one arena among others (and 
admittedly far from the most important) within which different ag-
encies and localities compete for resources. The local executive com-
mittees receive instructions from the higher authorities， such as the 
ministries， to fulfil particular tasks， and also from the republican 
Presidia to remove shortcomings in their performance. It is always a 
major problem for local leaders to find the resources to meet these 
obligations. The evidence shows that they can fight at sittings of the 
Standing Commissions for higher appropriations of social-welfare 
funds at least. One may， indeed， observe a glimpse of allocation politics 
in the proceedings of the Standing Commissions. For example， as a 
result of investigations of a sub-commission under his chairmanship， 
K.K. Nikolaev， the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk obkom， demandad， 
at one of the plenary meetings of the Budget Commission of the Soviet 
of the Union， higher output of bobbin thread， which was in short supply. 
A deputy chairman of the central Gosplan， V.P. Zotov， who had been 
called to testify at the meetings， defended himself against criticism on 
this matter by declaring that none of the three enterprises in the 
(28) 
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country where this type of thread was produced had sufficient capacity 
to increase their present production level. The chairman of the Com-
mission， 1.S. Senin， first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of 
Ministers， thereupon charged the sub-commission further with the task 
of communicating with these three enterprises， to establish the possi-
bilities of increasing the output of the product in question.36 Senin may 
have agreed to investigate the problem further at the request of 
Nikolaev， whose political status is at least as great as that of either 
Zotov or Senin. On the other hand， Senin's judgement may be in-
terpreted as implying that the government is unlikely to appropriate 
further funds for these industries， and the latter must make rational use 
of existing capacities to meet the demands. 
It should be noted that one of the supervisory operations of the 
Standing Commissions is to reappraise on-going co-ordination progra-
mmes in the light of their consequences and to adjust the existing 
policies incrementalIy. Therefore， the first secretary of a regional Party 
committee may further his own individual expectations at sittings of 
the Standing Commissions. A first secretary will do so at first at 
sub-commission IeveI， by making use of his own information and by 
deploying his own professionaI expertise and operational control of the 
body， i.e. as head of a sub-commission. At the meetings of the fulI 
Commission， he may attempt to effect the convergence of the expecta-
tions of others， by alIying himself with similar expectations of the 
members of other groups. On the other hand， there is a danger of his 
expectations being neutralized by the intervention of higher Party 
officials. Nevertheless， after the interaction between participants at the 
different levels in the Commissions， the latter adopts the recommenda-
tions which are to be directed at the relevant government bodies. In the 
process of the policy-adjustment by the latter， the recommendations of 
the Commission may be examined as a source of material to which they 
are moralIy obliged to refer. The revised policy drafted by the govern-
ment bodies and approved by the “colIective leadership" may again be 
transmitted as a demand of the latter at a given moment to the local 
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government bodies through the Presidia. If it were not practical to 
implement these demands， the local government officials would then 
consult and even lodge their complaints with localleaders， namely the 
regional first secretaries. In this way， the process repeats itself. 
Thus， the instances of resource politics of the kind cited above may be 
seen in this context. 
Aspect B: Politics in establishing authority relations among the partici-
pants and defining their role in the operations of the 
Standing Commissions. 
It is extremely difficult to determine the role definitions of in-
dividual members of the Standing Commissions， given the absence of 
detailed records of their activities. In attempting to interpret the 
admittedly limited data related to the communication process in the 
Standing Commissions， 1 have had recourse to a classification of role 
definitions in terms of reference groupS.37 1 have divided the partici-
pants into four groups and attributed to each a particular communi-
cation role in the meetings.38 These are A) Party and government 
top-level officials; B) the second echelon of the Party and government 
hierarchy; C) executive members of the lower Party and government 
apparatus and other organizations; and D) the rank and file of various 
organizations (including intelligentsia -artists， doctors， teachers， etc.). 
Taking into account the hierarchical structure of the Soviet political 
system， 1 have defined the role of each group according to the extent 
the group projects its relative power in the communication process， 
Group A members， for instance， have even acted as role definers for 
Groups C and D members， for Group A members have the political 
resources (such as the power to exercise sanctions ) topersuade Groups 
C and D members to accept their role definitions or set of expectations 
in a particular set of circumstances. In more concrete terms， the 
presence of Groups C and D is perceived by Group A as primarily 
serving the purposes of legitimation and public mobilization. The roles 
of Group A itself may roughly be defined in terms of“collective 
leadership". Now， Group B lying between Groups A and C， thus plays 
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a role as a conduit. (It should be noted that the assumption about Group 
B was made largely on the basis of the first secretaries of regional 
Party committees， since the latter constitute the largest single occu-
pational position in Group B). One of the roles of Group B will be to 
persuade Groups C and D to commit themselves to collective respon-
sibility and action. Group B is also capable of serving both as an agent 
for and a master of Groups C and D. The downward communication of 
Group B to Group C isnot confined to administrative co-ordination and 
conciliation activities， but also has an informing and educating aspect.39 
Group B members not only select and transmit information about 
Groups C and D，.o but also articulate the interests of Groups C and D. 
For instance， at one of the meetings of the Commission for Public 
Education， Science and Culture of the Soviet of the Union， two ed-
ucationalists stressed the need for preservation of historical mo・
numents in the republics， regions and districts. K. Murtazaev (first 
secretary， Bukhara obkom)proposed that serious attention should be 
paid to providing museums with adequate finacial material and techni-
cal assistance. Murtazaev， whose interests must certainly include the 
preservation of historical monuments in Bukhara region， was presu-
mably furthering his own concern in agreeing with the educationalists' 
suggestions. The chairman of the Commission， c.P. Trapeznikov， head 
of the Central Committee Department of Education and Science， con-
cluded the discussion by underlining that the executive committees of 
the local soviets and the public should render assistance to the improve-
ment of the conditions of the museums.41 Trapeznikov was therぬy
“screening out" a demand by placing the obligation in the hands of local 
bodies. 
The authority relations established above may be called here “rules 
of the game". 1n the absence of“rules of the gameぺtheStanding 
Commissions， for instance， whose membership consisted of a variety of 
organizational and functional groups with different educational and 
career backgrounds， might drift in directions deemed unfavourable by 
the Soviet leadership. The Commission members might openly criticize 
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and argue about policies taken by the Soviet leaders on such issues as 
foreign affairs， the national economic plan， nationality problems， social 
services， etc. This would be regarded by the Soviet leaders as dysfunc-
tional to the existing Soviet political system (to say the least ). The role 
definitions of groups based on their relative proximity to the centre (the 
political leadership) may， however， be treated as an indicator that 
behaviour is likely to be in a particular direction. 
Aspect C: Politics in formalizing functional values of the operations of 
the Standing Commissions. 
The actual functions of Standing Commissions are the end product 
of political processes. 1n earlier studies， 1 have attempted to chart the 
systemic relationships among the actual functions of the Supreme 
Soviet organs and between these and their formal functions (see Cart 1 
). The performance of these actual functions by the Supreme Soviet 
organs would appear to serve different interests， depending on the 
particular function involved. 1n some cases， itwould appear to serve the 
interests of individual Soviet leaders; in some， central government， 
local government and administrative leaders; and finally the public at 
large. 
The main object of the Soviet leadership with regard to the func-
tional value of the Standing Commissions appears to be to employ 
latter as a control-panel for one of its “transmission belt" (the soviets) 
which help impose the regime's will on society and on al social groups， 
and also to serve them as canalising bodies by applying or threatening 
sanctions against the lower Party and government apparatus. We could 
thus assume that the Soviet leadership has at least recognized the 
relevance of this branch of the State machine in alleviating some of the 
problems experienced in administering the country. 
It is clear， therefore， that not every member of the Standing 
Commissions is called upon to perform al the functions which the 
Standing Commissions actually do. True， the rank and file members of 
the organizations dominate in numerical terms the membership of the 
Standing Commissions. It is also true that they are normally allocated 
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to“appropriate" Commissions: workers engaged in social services in 
the Commission for Social Services; students in the Commission for 
Y outh Affairs; farrn workers in the Commission for Agriculture and so 
on. Their presence in these Commissions， however， isevidently meant 
for legitimation and public mobilization. They are brought in to be 
educated in how at a face value at least state decisions are made and 
to disseminate their knowledge on the activities of the Standing Com-
missions to their fellow members at work places. The presence of the 
regional first secretaries in the Commissions would certainly promote 
acceptance by the latter of the legitimacy of its structure and processes 
and functions， and identification by them of their interests with those of 
the regime. 
The regional secretaries perform a certain role in the process of 
legitimation of the laws and official policies currently in force， while 
being given the assurance that consultation and co-ordination with a 
view to implementing them takes place among themselves， and， if
necessary， subsequent amendments， though limited， to the newly in-
troduced laws and policies are considered. They are certainly caught up 
in the operations of the Standing Commissions whether they want or 
not， by rapid institutionalization of this particular branch of the state 
machine. They obtain some enhancement of status in return for their 
services in the operations of the Standing Commissions which are 
desired for their own purposes by the collective leadership. 
Aspect D: Politics in attempting to establish identity. 
Since the Soviet leadership has begun to see the Standing Com-
missions as a useful organic part rather than simply a decorative 
appendage of the Soviet political system， the leaders associated with 
this movement may attempt to translate their hopes and aspirations 
into a modus operandi which captures the imagination and the loyalty 
of those associated with the effort. Thus， not only the Presidium 
chairman and deputy chairmen but also the full-time officials of the 
Presidium (and perhaps， some part-time officials) and also chairmen of 
the Standing Commissions might have developed an organizational 
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allegiance and might seek to support‘their' organization against others 
by defending new values which have not yet received general accept-
ance. Since only a small number of the regional first secretaries are 
members of the Presidium and chairmen of Standing Commissions， one 
would expect that their involvement in this kind of politics is minimal. 
On the other hand， those first secretaries who have served as members 
of the particular Commissions for several convocations consecutively 
might develop some degree of identity with their respective Com-
missions. In that event， one could conceive the possibility of some role 
conflict between identification with the Standing Commission and with 
regional interests， though this would seem unlikely without consid-
erable further growth in the overall political significance of the 
Supreme Soviet bodies which would make them of greater importance 
in the career perspectives of the regional first secretaries. 
CONCLUSION 
Our attempt to identify the political role of the regional first 
secretaries suggests， although on admittedly rather fragmentary evi-
dence， that this group is of key importance in Supreme Soviet activities. 
This political role also involves at times the administrative and parti-
cipatory roles mentioned in our introduction. One of the reasons for 
administrative mobilization is that a policy such as the annual econo・
mic plan or five-year plan requires synchronized action by many 
agencies whose actions the planners seek to anticipate. The fulfilment 
of the plan must be checked， reassessed and adjusted after consultation 
with the interested parties concerned. Here， two operations will nece-
ssarily be involved: first， to inform strategically located personnel 
about the coordination programme which is built into the national 
economic plan， and to consult them about the workability of the 
programme which is an essential instrument of the execution of the 
plan set by the planners; and secondly， to adjust the programme in-
crementally by constant consultation with those most crucially in-
volved. The federal Standing Commissions are not of course the main 
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instrument for these purposes， but may act as an additional agency 
available to alleviate some of the difficulties of these operations. What 
Soviet authorities call the ‘legislative' activities concerning the national 
economic plan and budget may in fact involve in part the first operation 
mentioned above. The second operation noted above (incremental 
adjustment through consultation ) may be manifested by the 
Commissions' supervisory activities. The administrative and technical 
expertise possessed by the regional first secretaries and their present 
crucial Party positions are valuable resources in assisting these opera-
tions. 
Administrative mobilization also operates in both directions. We 
have observed， for example， how the regional first secretaries hear 
statements by higher officials， but also express the concerns of their 
particular regions to the laUer. Thus， the Standing Commissions serve 
as one of the mechanisms for tapping the opinions of the regional first 
secretaries at a given time for a given issue (probably excluding 
perhaps defence， foreign affairs， and internal security). These opera-
tions also involve contending centre-regional pressures. There is indeed 
some scope for the regional first secretary to fight for modest increased 
appropriations of materials and funds for his region. The increased 
representation and activities of the regional first secretaries in the 
Commissions will thus provide an additional bargaining channel 
through which secretaries can advocate their own particularist local 
concerns to central organs and by which (within limits) they can beUer 
influence the mix of priorities and budgetary allocations from the 
central government ministries. On the evidence available one cannot 
demonstrate that locally recruited first secretaries tend to perceive a 
stronger sense of identity with their own political bases than non-locally 
recruited first secretaries. In any case， the increased te'nure of office as 
regional first secretary presumably has the affect of narrowing poten-
tial differences of this kind. 
As to the participatory role， this process would appear to afford 
underchannels for wider public participation. A regional first secretary 
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in seeking to advance regional interests would base himself partly on 
the information provided by the lower level soviets in his region and by 
other individuals and groups. Indeed， one contributory factor in the 
increased activities of regional first secretaries in the federal Com-
missions may be the trend toward greater devolution of policymaking 
initiative and authority to the local soviets. The main object of the 
federal Commissions' operations from the viewpoint of the Soviet 
leadership appears to be， by and large， not to improve the decision-mak-
ing process， but to improve the decision-imρlementing process and also 
to moderate conflict and protest on the issues concerned. There is， of 
course， another hypothetical possibility of indirect and limited public 
participation in the process of policy-making through the operations of 
the Standing Commissions. As Table I indicates， there are now 
numerous rank and file of various organizations represented in the 
federal Commissions. If the operations of the Standing Commissions 
are to remain alive and meaningful in some form or another， the 
Commissions may have to digest and accommodate some demands of 
these groups. At this juncture， the regional first secretaries could act as 
an appropriate conduit. It is they， more than any other participants， 
who are able to let off steam by transmitting the views of the rank and 
file of the organizations. 
The presence and activities of the regional first secretaries in the 
federal Commissions are probably one of the key contributing factors， 
in Huntington's terms， to its institutional adaptability， complexity， 
autonomy and coherence. Their present importance from the viewpoint 
of institutional development will， however， be swayed by various 
factors such as the lack of institutional identity， the motivations of the 
Soviet leadership， changes in the existing 'rules of the game' and the 
motivation of the regional first secretaries themselves. 
I noted earlier that certain individuals and groups may change the 
behaviour expected of them by other groups and individuals. One 
reason why this may be likely to occur is the lack of identification and 
autonomy of the Supreme Soviet organs. The identity of each Com-
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mission member， for instance， would appear normally to be intrinsically 
in his original occupation since his duties as deputy take up a relatively 
small proportion of his total time and attention. That is to say that each 
member potentially assumes his own presence in the Standing Com. 
missions as extrinsic and casual. There may be occasions when the 
rank and file members of the Commissions meet with contradictions 
between their assumed role definitions in the Commissions and their 
role definitions in their working places. This would certainly not foster 
an organizational allegiance and estrit de corts in their actions. It 
should be restated， therefore， that when the institutional identity is not 
fully established， the introduction of new norms and values in the 
existing state organs are likely to meet with some resistance. For 
instance， the rank and file of various organizations who are members 
of the Standing Commissions may feel that they are being exploited by 
being asked to shoulder more responsibility for litle extra reward. We 
have already conjectured on the role of the regional first secretaries in 
such an eventuality. Even where operations are carried out under the 
‘rules of the game'， there may stil be situations where behaviour 
conforms to the expectations of certain individuals and groups but not 
of others. Thus， deviant expectations of some members may have an 
effect on the existing‘rules of the game'. However， the main sources of 
change and development may be found precisely in this type of deviant 
activity relating to authority relations. But this will largely depend on 
the policy concerning the operations of the Standing Commissions set 
by the top political leadership and ability to adjust the policy by the 
latter as the circumstances dictate. 
L.I. Brezhnev's speech to the Twenty.fifth Congress on this subject 
is rather disappointing. He merely stated that in recent years the 
activities of the Standing Commissions have been made appreciably 
more active.<2 This can be interpreted as indicating either that Bre. 
zhnev is personally content with the extent the federal Commissions 
have been neutralized by placing key Party officials， namely， the 
regional first secretaries， inthem， or that the collective leadership as a 
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whole has attained its main object with regard to the functional value 
of the Supreme Soviet organs， or thirdly that there has been some 
development of disagreement among the leaders43 as to further reac・
tivation of these state organs and as to the direction these organs 
should follow. Under such circumstances， the regional first secretaries 
might be expected to react in either of two ways. First， without positive 
support from the Soviet leadership， they may feel threatened， because 
they fear a certain loss of political control. They may thus try to stifle 
the enthusiasm of other members. lndeed， there are several direct 
avenues available to them to pursue their own interests rather than in 
the Standing Commissions. Such a regional first secretary， on the other 
hand， may interpret the Soviet leadership's conspicuous silence on the 
subject as giving him a free hand. He may first find that the Com-
missions' work presents opportunities for pursuing his own interests. 
He may thus lobby quietly behind the scenes， taking advantage of the 
presence of top Party and government officials， or， inthe process of 
leading a sub-commission or working group， he may be able to establish 
informal communication links not otherwise obtainable， and he may 
simply exploit other individuals and groups for pursuance of his own 
interests. Whichever way it goes， one would expect the existing uncer-
tainty as to the actual functions of the Standing Commissions in the 
political system to continue. 
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Having done research into the institutionalization of the so-called ‘Special 
Projects Office' in the U.S. Department of Navy (which is responsible for the 
design， development and commissioning of the Polaris missile)， Sapolsky 
argues that the basic ingredient for its success as an institution is not the 
management control system known as PERT (Programme Evaluation and 
Review Technique) invented by the agency， but rather political techniques like 
inter-and intra-departmental politics (so as to avoid entanglement with other 
agencies)， incentive contracts and ensuing competition between subordinates. 
See H.M. Sapolsky， The Polaris system development: Bureaucratic and program-
matic success in government， Cambridge， Mass.， 1972. 
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28. The participants in politics are as follows: a) Soviet leadership; b) Supreme 
Soviet leadership; c) Presidium officials; d) Echelon groups-these refer to 
administrative levels， and these in turn may reflect geographical and ethnic 
differences; e) Institutional groups-these refer to institutional interest groups 
such as Party， TUC， Police and Military; f) Functional groups-these refer to 
professional groups such as teachers， engineers， academics， doctors， artists and 
administrative (functional) officials; and g) Social groups -this type of group 
refers to broad social groups such as workers， farmers， office workers， students 
and pensioners. 
29. Larry B. H】1defines institutionalization as a process that occurs over time 
in which the organization creates authority relationships vis-a-vis the environ‘ 
mental factors (see L.B. Hill，“Institutionalization， the Ombudsman， and 
Bureaucracy"， inthe American Political Science Review， Vo1.68， 1974， pp.10075--
10085). In our view， identifying the political process with the creation of 
authority relationship is too narrow， i.e. it is just one of many aspects of the 
political process. 
30. The chairman of the Kirgiz Presidium， T. Kulatov stated that‘last year 
(1965) alone the Osh Region Executive Committ巴eadopted 95 d巴cisionson 
economic questions jointly with the regional Party committee. 1 do not doubt 
that the executive committee could have decided many of these questions 
independently. Sometimes one is at a loss to explain this helplessness'(see Izv.， 
2. 7. 6). Criticism of excessive indulgence in such 'joint' decisions is often 
voiced by Party bodies themselves， but criticism by a senior member of the 
soviet hierarchy is somewhat unusual and may indicate a concern to promote 
his 'own' hierarchy and reduce its dependence on the Party machine. 
31. See Izvestia， 6 November 1971 
32. See Izvestia， 9 August 1969. 
3. See Sovety Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia， No.lO， 1969， p.83. 
34. Izvestia， 19 October 1969. 
35. One of the provisions of the decision adopted by the Presidium of the Council 
of Ministers was that the central Gosplan， together with the federal Ministry 
of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education， the committee on vocational-
technical education and school construction work and to provide for the 
necessary measures in the plans for 1970 and 1971-1975. 
36. See Sovetskaia Belorussia， 30 November 1962. 
37. Cf. Maureen E. Cain，“Some suggested developments for role and reference 
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group analysis"， inthe British Journal 01 Sociology， Vol.XIX， N02 (January 
1968) 
38. According to the evidence found， the communication lines between these 
groups may be summarized as follows: Group A (together with some members 
of the Supreme Soviet Presidium， and government officials invited to report on 
their activities) pass on either information on a particular issue， oran order， to
Groups B， C and D. The executives of Group C express certain grievances and 
opinions upwards to Group B. Group B thus lies between Groups A and C in this 
two-way communication. Group D may be called bystanders in this context. 
39. See e.g. Izvestia， 4 N ovember 1971. 
40. See e.g. Izvestia， 9 August 1969，6 November 1971 and 13 November 1971; see 
also Pravda， 21 May 1971. 
41. See Izvestia， 9 August 1969. 
42. Pravda， 25 February 1976. 
43. Mikolai V. Podgorny， who then as the Chairman of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet viewed the soviets as his own 'power base'， had re-emphasized 
their importance in the Soviet political system， but significantly in rather 
abstract and esoteric terms-l5overshenstvovanie vlastnykh lunktsii Sovetov. (See 
his article “XXV s'ezd KPSS i razvitie sotsialisticheskoi demokratiiぺin
Kommunおt，No.17， 1976， pp.l0-28). Having succeeded in removing Podgorny 
from Politburo， L.I. Brezhnev himself has now resumed the Chairmanship of 
the federal Presidium. He can and has to play the role of Podgorny as well 
as the role of General-Secretary of the CPSU. 
Appendix - A 
Functions of the Supreme Soviet organs (see Chart 1) 
We envisage the Supreme Soviet organs as a sub-system linking the 
political and social systems. The Supreme Soviet organs communicate 
their messages through Supreme Soviet macro-and micro-communi-
cation nets to the masses as well as to the relevant executive and 
administrative bodies. For this purpose， the federal and republican 
Presidia organize and direct the activities of the Standing Commissions 
of the Supreme Soviets and also subordinate soviet organs -their電trans-
mission belt'. In this connection， particular importance attaches to the 
federal Presidium's organizational function， which is to keep the entire 
(45) 
171 
communication mechanism of the Supreme Soviets in control and 
operative. Having established a communication mechanism of their 
own， the Supreme Soviet organs may have thus become a more effec-
tive control-panel for the電transmissionbelt' than they used to be. The 
pseudo-executive function， as for instance in activities related to for-
eign affairs， isdirected mainly towards legitimation of and identifica-
tion with the regime. Such activities have always received greater 
publicity than other activities of the Supreme Soviet organs in Soviet 
mass media. The performance of formal legislative and supervisory 
functions in policy areas other than international relations is also 
intended to contribute to legitimation and identification， but at the 
same time is aimed at motivating the public and the executive and 
administrative bodies (from central down to local level) to accept and 
to carry out the policies approved by the電collectiveleadership'. ln 
performing these formal functions， the Supreme Soviet organs 
furthermore serve as one of the mechanisms for tapping the opinions of 
the executive and administrative bodies. Through the selective enforce-
ment of rules and instructions by the Supreme Soviet organs， 
particularly by the federal and republican Presidia， the regime hopes to 
optimize results in certain sections of state activity. The Supreme 
Soviet organs， particularly the Standing Commissions， also serve as one 
of the arenas available for the articulation of interests on the social-
weIfare sections of the annual economic plan and budget. For the same 
and other areas (excIuding defence， foreign affairs and heavy industry) 
of state activity， the federal and republican Supreme Soviet organs as 
a whole provide circular two.way transactions for the articulation of 
particularistic demands and individual attitudes and perhaps also the 
articulation of tendencies. This process might assist the Soviet political 
system in adapting itself to the changing social and economic envi-
ronment. However， the chief participants in the processes of articula-
tion are evidently the executive and administrative officials and spe-
cialists rather than special groups in the pubIic at large. 
The preformance of these actual functions by the Supreme Soviet 
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organs would appear to serve different interests， depending on the 
particular function involved. In some cases， itwould appear to serve the 
interests of individual Soviet leaders (e.g. possibly Brezhnev); in 
some， central government， local executive and administrative 
leaders; and finalIy the public at Iarge. 
Appendix -B 
Institutional development (see Chart 2) 
The state of three factors， namely， (A) Environment， (B) Power 
structure of Soviet Ieadership， and (C) Doctrine could affect (D) the 
Supreme Soviet organs in their operations and organizational structure， 
which may lead to the addition of new (F) N orms and values. The Iatter 
are， however， established through (E) PoIitical processes among the 
participants who are directly and indirectly associated with the 
operations of the Supreme Soviet organs. The effects of newly disposed 
norms and values may feed back to the three factors mentioned above 
(A， B and C). There is aIso some fIow of feedback from the factors (D) 
and (E). In this way， the process of institutionaI development is repeated 
again and again (see Chart 2). 
One could further break down Chart 2 into four different types of 
the process of factoral interaction (interaction mainly between factors 
A， B and C) as folIows:-
Ty.争邑 1 ~/ノA~~
n~、c/υ一一ι一一F
Type 2 
B////A D-一一→E一一一一..F
¥¥c/ノ
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Tyte 3 
Tゆe4 
B/FA¥¥D--F一一一官
¥¥C A 
A~D一一c ノ
As one might notice immediately， the central factor in the process 
in al types (except type 4) is factor B， which is the chief power source 
for maintaining the flow of the developmental process. In type 1， the 
wishes of the Soviet leaders to reactivate the Supreme Suviet organs 
for desired purposes are executed by stimulating the environment (such 
as the introduction of a new educational system， economic policy and 
administrative changes) and by justifying their actions with the 
電doctrineof the state'. Their actions to change the Supreme Soviet 
organizational structure may also be a part of a subsequent change of 
their own power structure. In type 2， on the other hand， a changing 
socio-economic environment may impel the leaders to adapt the 
Supreme Soviet organs to the new situation. The Soviet leaders will 
take action to this effect by placing the doctrine in ρoint d'appui and 
even revising the content of the doctrine so as to comply with their 
efforts. As a reverse process in type 2， the Soviet leaders may con-
sciously implement the 'doctrine of the state'. What has happened in the 
case of the Supreme Soviet may well be type 1. On the other hand， the 
reality may lie in the mixture of types 1， 2 and 3， for the factors are 
more likely to interact in both ways -forward and backward. Type 4 
shows the impact of three factors upon the organization independently. 
This process might occur in future but only if the Supreme Soviet 
organs had established a certain degree of identity. 
(48) 
CHART 1. FORMAL AND ACTUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPREME 
SOVIET ORGANS 
Political system Social system 
E又ecutiveand 
admmistiative 
sub.systcm 
Supreme Soviet organs 
(Presidium & Standing Commissions) 
FORMAL FUNCTJONS 
Organizational 
Pseudo-executive 
Legislative 
Supervisory 
ACTUAL FUNCTJONS 
Communication 
Legitimation and 
Identification 
Mobilization 
administ 
Interest articulation 
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